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BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS 
 
n  We simulate how earnings 
inequality and poverty rates would 
change if educational attainment 
were to increase.
n  The most intense simulation raises 
the share of prime-age adults with an 
associate degree from about 10 to 20 
percent, and with a bachelor’s degree 
from about 40 to 60 percent.
n  Earnings increase by 5 to 
15 percent, but the gains are 
concentrated among lower-income 
individuals.
n  Consequently, the ratio of income 
between the top and bottom halves 
falls, especially for men.
n  Moreover, the fraction of prime-
age adults living in poverty falls from 
11.3 to 8.9 percent.
For additional details, see the working 
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/319.
Adults in the United States without a college degree have fared relatively poorly in 
terms of employment and earnings outcomes over the past four decades. Te college 
wage premium—the ratio of earnings of those who have received a bachelor’s degree 
to those who have not—increased between 1980 and 2000 and has held steady since, 
remaining at roughly 90 percent for both men and women. In addition, prime-age 
adults with no more than a high school degree have experienced a sizable decline in 
employment rates, both in absolute terms and compared to college-degree holders. 
Te divergent economic outcomes of those with and without a college degree have led 
many observers to stress the need for increased skill attainment, in particular increased 
college attainment, to boost individual economic security and address rising income 
inequality. Tis proposal is consistent with the arguments emphasized in the book Te
Race between Education and Technology (Goldin and Katz 2008). In highly simplifed 
terms, Goldin and Katz argue that, during the 1980s and 1990s, the demand for college-
educated workers rose faster than the supply of college-educated workers, leading to a 
rise in their relative wage. 
We conduct a simulation exercise that gauges the likely impact of increased rates 
of college attainment on measures of income inequality and economic insecurity. Te 
results reveal that increasing college attainment would shrink gaps between the 90th 
percentile and lower half of the earnings distribution, as well as between the median 
and bottom, in most cases. Increased college degree attainment would meaningfully 
raise economic security for individuals near the bottom of the earnings distribution and 
reduce poverty rates. However, increases in college attainment would not reduce gaps 
at the very top of the distribution—for instance, the 99/90 percentile ratio. Te policy 
prescription of increased educational attainment should thus appeal to those whose 
primary concern is the economic security of lower-income individuals, but it will not 
satisfy the goals of reduced income shares at the top of the distribution.1 
Simulation Approach 
We measure employment, earnings, income, and poverty status using the same source 
the federal government uses for ofcial income and poverty measures, the Annual Social 
and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey. To illustrate changes in 
earnings and inequality over a long horizon, we focus on the 1980 survey (covering 
earnings from 1979) and the 2019 survey (covering earnings from 2018). To minimize 
concerns about schooling and retirement decisions, we focus on simulating greater 
degree attainment for adult civilians of prime age, 25−54. We defne full-time, full-year 
1This paper builds on a 2015 policy memo that Hershbein and Kearney wrote with Larry Summers and posted on 
the Hamilton Project website (Hershbein, Kearney, and Summers 2015). 
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Among men age 25−54, 
the employment rate fell 
from 92 to 85 percent 
between 1979 and 2018, 
with larger losses for
those without a college 
degree. 
workers (FTFY) as those usually working at least 35 hours per week and at least 40 weeks 
of the year. For earnings, we include annual wages and salaries, as well as (positive) 
business income, adjusted for infation to year 2018 dollars. Because poverty status is 
based on family rather than individual income, we measure income relative to poverty 
thresholds using total family income and ofcial poverty thresholds for the individual’s 
family size and type. 
We examine four groups: all prime-age FTFY workers, prime-age FTFY men and 
women separately, and all prime-age men, regardless of work status. Among the last 
group, all men age 25−54, the employment rate fell from 92 to 85 percent between 1979 
and 2018, with larger losses for those without a college degree. Partly as a result, earnings 
(adjusted for infation) fell for the bottom half; even among FTFY men, earnings for 
the bottom half barely budged. At the top, earnings rose substantially for both groups. 
Among women, earnings increased for almost everyone, but the gains were much larger 
at the higher end of the distribution. 
What would increasing educational attainment do to these trends? We simulate 
three hypothetical scenarios. Simulation 1 raises the share of the group (for each group 
above) with at least a bachelor’s degree (BA share) to 50 percent. Simulation 2 raises 
the share of the sample with an associate degree (AA share) to 15 percent and the BA 
share to 50 percent. Simulation 3 raises the AA share to 20 percent and the BA share 
to 60 percent. Both new AA holders and new BA holders are drawn from the existing 
high school graduate population. For each scenario, we assign the “new” AA and BA 
holders simulated earnings in two ways. Te distribution method assigns a random draw 
from the distribution of existing AA or BA holders (including those with higher than a 
BA), within cells defned by age group, race, and sex. For example, under this approach, 
suppose a black male 29-year-old with a high school diploma were simulated to have 
bachelor’s degree; he would be assigned the earnings from a random draw of an existing 
black male 25-to-34-year-old who already has a bachelor’s degree. Te causal parameter
method, on the other hand, assigns a percentage boost to an individual’s existing income, 
where the specifc percentage boost comes from studies that estimate the return to 
someone just earning an associate or bachelor’s degree: 29 percent for an AA and 68 
percent for a BA. (Te working paper provides the underlying studies, as well as full 
methodological details of the simulation.) Te distribution method allows an individual 
currently out of the workforce to be assigned positive earnings via the simulation and 
also accounts for the possibility that diferent people have diferent returns to college. Te 
causal parameter, on the other hand, may come closer to capturing the average return for 
individuals likely to be afected by a policy to boost educational attainment. 
Because an increase in the share of the population with a college degree tends to 
lower the college wage premium, all else equal—this law of supply and demand is the 
foundation for the Goldin and Katz approach mentioned above—we adjust earnings for 
this relative wage. Specifcally, we estimate that a 1 percent increase in the relative supply 
of BA to non-BA labor narrows the wage premium by 0.26 percent; analogously, a 1 
percent increase in the relative supply of AA to high school graduate labor decreases that 
relative wage premium by 0.17 percent. Depending on the simulation, these adjustments 
narrow the BA wage premium by between 4 and 11 percent and the AA wage premium 
by between 1 and 11 percent. 
Impacts on Inequality and Poverty 
In 2018, 45 percent of FTFY prime-age workers held at least a BA and 7 percent held 
an AA; among all prime-age adults, these numbers were 40 and 11 percent, respectively. 
Simulation 1 raises the BA share to 50 percent, a modest increase among FTFY workers, 
but a substantial one among all prime-age individuals, requiring that 11.1 million more 
adults hold a bachelor’s degree. Simulation 3 is even more demanding, roughly doubling 
this number for BAs and adding about 10 million AAs. All three simulations raise 
earnings in each of the four samples for roughly the lower three-quarters of the earnings 
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In 2018, 45 percent of 
full-time, year-round 
workers held at least a 
bachelor’s degree and 7 
percent held an associate 
degree; the most intense 
simulation increases 
these shares to 60 and 20 
percent. 
distribution, with the strongest gains in the middle. Te highest percentiles, however, 
show much smaller gains (or even losses among FTFY men) due to the relative wage 
efects that lower the college wage premium. 
To understand how distributional outcomes are afected, we compare observed 
and simulated percentile earnings ratios for prime-age FTFY men, prime-age FTFY 
women, and prime-age men. (For parsimony, we focus here on the third and most 
intense simulation.) Each group saw sizable increases in these ratios between 1979 and 
2018, particularly between the 90th and lower percentiles, implying that the top were 
pulling away from those below them. However, the ratios from the simulations—under 
either method—show that increases in college attainment for FTFY men and women 
would lead to meaningful reductions in earnings inequality. For example, among FTFY 
men, the 90/10 ratio increased from 3.86 to 5.58, implying that in 2018 men at the 90th 
percentile earned 5.58 times as much as men at the 10th percentile, up from 3.86 times as 
much in 1979. Simulation 3 would bring that ratio down to 5.16 (distribution method) or 
5.02 (causal parameter method), reducing the increase in inequality by about one-third. 
Among FTFY women, the 90/10 ratio increased from 3.6 to 5.0; simulation 3 would 
bring that ratio down to between 4.25 and 4.41, reducing the increase in inequality by 
almost half. We also fnd sizable reductions for the 90/25 and 50/25 ratios, although 
changes in the 99/90 ratio are slight, as most people in this range already have college 
degrees. 
For prime-age men, we omit ratios including the 10th percentile (which corresponded 
to zero earnings in both 1979 and 2018) and focus on the other ratios, as shown in 
Figure 1. As the causal method increases earnings only for those with positive earnings, 
the simulated efects on income inequality are smaller at the lower end than those from 
the distribution method. Te latter simulation implies the 50/25 ratio, which rose from 
1.71 to 2.18 between 1979 and 2018, would fall to 1.89. Te 90/25 ratio, which rose 
from 3.33 to 6.00, would fall to 4.83. Te distribution method simulation also shows the 
employment rate would rise by 2.8 percentage points, suggesting gains below the 25th 
percentile not captured by the displayed ratios. 
We also consider how the three simulation scenarios would afect measures of 
economic insecurity among prime-age adults, as captured by diferent ranges of income 
relative to ofcial poverty thresholds (FPL). We consider the outcomes of deep poverty 
(below 50 percent FPL), poverty (below 100 percent FPL), near poverty (below 150 
percent FPL), and low-income (below 200 percent FPL). Each of these measures of 
poverty increased between 1979 and 2018, with the share of prime-age adults living 
below the poverty line increasing from 8.2 to 11.3 percent. Under the distribution 
Figure 1  Percentile Earnings Ratios, Prime-Age Men 
7 
Observed 1979 6 
Observed 2018 
5 Simulated 2018: Distribution 
Simulated 2018: Parameter 4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
50/25 90/25 90/50 99/90 
NOTE: Figure shows ratios of earnings for men, age 25−54, across diferent percentiles, as measured in 1979 and 
2018 and as simulated according to the two methods described in the text. For example, in 2018, a man at the 
90th percentile earned six times as much as a man at the 25th percentile, but the simulations reduce this ratio to 
4.8 or 5.1. 
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Reductions in the 
near-poverty or low-
income rate are larger, 
with the first falling from 
18.5 to 14.2 percent, and 
the second from 26.5 to 
20.4 percent. Both simu-
lated rates are lower than 
their actual levels 
in 1979. 
Figure 2  Family Income Relative to Poverty Line, Shares of Prime-Age Adults 
30% 
Observed 1979 
25% Observed 2018 
20% Simulated 2018: Distribution 
Simulated 2018: Parameter 
15% 
10% 
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NOTE: Figure shows shares of adults, age 25−54, whose family incomes fall below 50, 100, 150, and 200 
percent of the federal poverty line, respectively, as measured in 1979 and 2018 and as simulated according 
to the two methods described in the text. For example, in 2018, 18.5 percent of adults age 25−54, lived in a 
family with income below 150 percent of the federal poverty line 
method, the simulated poverty rate falls by 2.4 percentage points, to 8.9 percent. 
Reductions in the near-poverty or low-income rate are larger, with the frst falling 
from 18.5 to 14.2 percent, and the second from 26.5 to 20.4 percent. Both simulated 
rates are lower than their actual levels in 1979. Te rate in deep poverty also falls, but 
only modestly, from 5.6 to 5.0 percent, refecting the concentration of deep poverty 
among those with less than a high school degree, a group not directly afected by the 
simulation. Under the causal parameter method, the reductions are roughly half as large, 
a consequence of this method boosting earnings only for those who already work and 
not for those who aren’t employed. 
Conclusion 
We simulate the efects of increasing college attainment, both bachelor’s and associate 
degrees, for men and women age 25–54, on earnings and earnings inequality. Our two 
diferent approaches yield similar conclusions: increasing the educational attainment 
of adults without a college degree will increase their average earnings, with gains 
concentrated in the lower half of the earnings distribution. Tese earnings shifs imply 
meaningful reductions in rates of poverty and near-poverty, with modest reductions in 
upper-lower tail inequality, but little impact at the very top of the distribution. 
REFERENCES 
Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2008. Te Race between Education and Technology. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Hershbein, Brad, Melissa S. Kearney, and Lawrence H. Summers. 2015. “Increasing Education: 
What It Will and Will Not Do for Earnings and Inequality.” Washington, DC: Te Hamilton 
Project. 
Hershbein, Brad, Melissa S. Kearney, and Luke Pardue. 2020. “College Attainment, Income 
Inequality, and Economic Security: A Simulation Exercise.” NBER working paper. Washington, 
DC: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
 
 
WEBSITE
W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research @UpjohnInstitute 
upjohn.org 
4 
